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Honeypots are a relatively new way to deal with threats but in a very 
peculiar way; they are not a solution themselves as they don’t solve a 
problem, rather than that Honeypots are flexible tools that can be used 
to collect information about the way an attack can affect the network. To 
achieve this Honeypots should be an easy target for attackers, and that’s 
the reason why certain precautions must be taken when using one of 
these tools to avoid a problem bigger than a solution. 
 
In this paper it's going to be tested the effect that the implementation of a 
honeypot or honeynet can have in a production network under two 
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A honeypot can be described as a tool that provides certain level of early-
detection for attacks by appearing as a vulnerable node (server, host, 
service, IP address range, etc) in the network. It can be also described as 
an information gathering tool that can collect information about an 
attacker such as the source of the attack, methods used, intention of the 
attack and much more. It’s important to remember that a honeypot does 
not replace traditional security systems such as Firewalls and IPS, even 
though it shares certain characteristics with an IDS and a few less with 
an IPS.  
 
For a honeypot to be successful at least two characteristics are 
necessary, it should look like an easy target with valuable information 
and it should not jeopardize the integrity of its host system.  
As any other system they have certain advantages and disadvantages [1]: 
Pros 
 Collected information may be small but useful. 
 As honeypots can act as end-points encrypted information can be 
captured. 
 Normally reduce false positives and can catch false negatives. 








 As they only see what interacts with them they have a reduced 
scope.  
 It brings new risks to the system. If the honeypot is not well 
secured it can be very harmful. 
 
According to SANS [2] there are two main reasons behind the use of 
honeypots: 
1. Learn the methods that the attackers intend to use to penetrate 
the system. As every activity in the honeypot should be logged the 
system administrator can get insights into the attackers’ 
techniques. 
2. It can help gathering forensic information to aid in the prosecution 
of intruders.  
A honeypot can take a variety of shapes and can be located anywhere in 
a network, hence its dynamic nature. In a firewalled system it can be 
located inside, outside or in the DMZ; and it can resemble a web server, 
a file server, a file, database table, an IP address and even a simple host 
machine, but its value will depend on the amount of information that it 
can gather.  
 
By nature any activity that goes into the honeypot can be pointed as a 
malicious activity because the honeypot doesn't have any real valuable 
information. Also any traffic that goes out of the honeypot is an indicator 







"A honeynet is a network of high interaction honeypots that simulates a production network and 
configured such that all activity is monitored, recorded and in a degree, discretely regulated". [3] 
Honeynets are mostly used to monitor a network more extensive than 
what a honeypot can handle. Most of the time the honeynets are 
composed of high interaction honeypots and usually are part of larger 
NIDS. They need to accomplish two main principles for a successful and 
secure implementation: Data Capture and Data Control. Any information 
in or out of the honeynet must be captured for analysis, but also all that 
data should be controlled to avoid a widespread attack from the honeynet 
to the production equipments. One important issue to consider is that 
before installing a honeynet the network administrator must have 
approved it. Many concerns exists regard the implementation of these 
tools, especially regarding infrastructure security and the legality of the 
implementation because of the information that can record the honeynet. 
 
1.3 Vulnerabilities and Exploits 
A vulnerability is a bug or flaw in a system that make that system 
susceptible to an attack even when it's used as expected. Citing from the 
Microsoft's Technet website [4]: 
"A security vulnerability is a flaw in a product that makes it infeasible – even when using the 
product properly —to prevent an attacker from usurping privileges on the user's system, 
regulating its operation, compromising data on it, or assuming ungranted trust." 
So far every system has shown some sort of flaw, but the key for a bug or 
flaw to become a vulnerability is that there must exist a tool that when 
used against the system can take advantage of such flaw. If that 
condition is achieved then the system is vulnerable and that tool or 
method used to attack the vulnerability is called Exploit. And learning 








2.1 Honeynets: previous implementations 
In the introduction we commented how a honeypot works and 
determined that any traffic that goes into or out of it should be treated as 
malicious. This characteristic gives the honeynet its simplicity and 
effectiveness. Because of this effectiveness we've found various mature 
implementations of honeynets.  
 
2.1.1 The Honeynet Project 
The Honeynet Project [5] is a non-profit organization founded in 1999 
dedicated to the research and improvement of the security in the 
Internet. It is based in chapters around the world providing support to 
those chapters through awareness, information and providing tools to 
continue the research. Several chapters have been created from the 
Honeynet Project and their modus operandi remains the same.  
 
Most of these chapters have an active participation in the main Honeynet 
Project as they annually share their results. In these results they inform 
about the technology used in the last year and any modification made, 
the findings in that period along with comments, the lessons learned and 
some other organizational information. The most important part is that 
the findings are of public domain and anyone can benefit from the 
implementation of this distributed honeynet. In this address 
http://www.honeynet.org/og we can find a table with the list of the chapters of 







2.1.2 The Georgia Tech Honeynet project 
One of those honeynet implementations is the Georgia Tech Honeynet 
Project [6] [7]. Since 2002 the University of Georgia Tech deployed a 
honeynet in their internal network with positive and satisfying results. 
The first step in the project was to obtain the permission from the 
administrators of the academic, legal and technological departments. 
This was necessary because several concerns were raised regarding the 
legality of this project and the security of the information involved. In our 
case we didn't need to get authorization of the network administrator 
because the project was implemented in a controlled network. 
Following with the case of Georgia Tech, after the pertinent permissions 
were obtained the implementation followed. In that project they first 
implemented a GEN I honeynet because of the simplicity that it offered, 
but after a while they used a GEN II honeynet. The difference between 
the two types of honeynet is that the second generation is easier to 
deploy and the data control is more sophisticated than first generation.  
So far the project has achieved its goals and continues to provide 
valuable protection and information. The main purpose of the project 
was research, and the students and teachers are using it for on-going 
academic investigations [8]. Another of its goals was to become a tool to 
enhance the security of the network and it succeeded having identify 
over 165 [6] compromised systems within the internal network. At the 
moment they haven't detected any incident caused by the deployment of 









2.2 Detecting attacks and malwares using Honeynets 
 
2.2.1 Network traffic analysis 
A successful honeynet is able to capture all the traffic that goes in or out 
at network level which is the most obvious and easiest information to 
capture. This is because the only way that a malware or an attack can 
reach the honeynet is by a network connection.  
 
The use of Snort [9] [8] is a widely implemented solution to sniff the traffic 
of the honeynet. It's an open source application that has proven to be 
very reliable and difficult to detect by the bad guys while used. Another 
sniffer tool is Wireshark (previously named Ethereal) [10] [8] that can be 
used to detect and log the network traffic. The most notorious difference 
is that Snort is more often used as an NIDS rather than simply as a 
sniffer. In any case with both tools we are able to capture traces of the 
network traffic and find different types of attacks such as DoS, Port 
scanning and Telnet/SSH/FTP breaches. Also it's possible to know if one 
of the nodes of the honeynet has been turned into a zombie by a netbot 
by detecting SPAM messages being sent from the honeynet or if a worm 
is trying to propagate. Other important information that can be gathered 
is the precedence of an attack, very important if the attacker don't spoof 
the IP address to conceal its identity.  
 
Another characteristic about honeypots/honeynets is that the 
information that goes from one point to another may be encrypted and 
intermediate nodes can't detect that information. But as the nodes within 
the honeynet are end-points they can also log that encrypted information 






2.2.2 Operative system logs 
As seen network traffic can be a very powerful tool to detect attacks, but 
in some of the cases this doesn't give us the details about the malwares, 
but another important source of information are the OS logs. 
 
Most of the OSs can log certain type of information, for example UNIX 
and Linux based honeypots are able to store login information and shell's 
command history even after a system reboot. Also many daemons log any 
action related to them in a separated file for each one. In Windows based 
honeypots there are mainly three types of logs: Application, Security and 
System. In any case no matter which type of information each OS stores 
it can be valuable. 
 
2.2.3 Snort 
Snort [9] is an open source network intrusion detection and prevention 
system (N-IDS/IPS). It's not very user friendly and at the beginning it 
was rather complicated and difficult to use and implement, and that's 
the reason why during the in-line capture of the data in the project it was 
only used as a sniffer. But when you get used to its interface is easier to 
understand and use, in fact by using a couple of rules it was possible to 
identify a malware in the honeynet. The use of Snort will be explained in 
more detail in the results part. 
 
2.3 Possible threats in the use of honeypots/honeynets 
Some past researches and experiments have been done about the use of 
honeypots and the threats that may be present in its use. One example 
of these researches can be found in the document Information Warfare: 






paper the authors deployed three high interaction honeypots to study 
how quickly such machines could get compromised. For reference they 
stated that a machine is compromised when the honeypot intended a 
connection to another machine without intervention of the legitimate 
operator. These experiments resulted on the breach of the three tested 
honeypots. Two of them where infected with worms, and one of them was 
attacked with a DoS. Two of them were also port scanned. If these 
machines were located within a production network and the production 
machines were not protected, they could’ve easily infected with the self-
replicated worms that infected the honeypots.  
Another great article that indicates three of the main problems that 
honeypots have is Problems and Challenges with Honeypots [12]. In this 
article the author mentions three problems in the implementation of 
honeypots that are: 
1. Identifying honeypots 
2. Exploiting honeypots 
3. Attacker clientele.  
 
For the security of the network the second point (Exploiting honeypots) is 
the interesting one. We do know that the honeypot is going to be 
exploited some time, after all that’s its mission; what is really important 
is that we take the measures to avoid a problem after that. One of those 
measures is the correct implementation of firewall rules, as we need that 
the honeynet be visible and accessible from the outside the traffic should 
be allowed in. But malicious traffic can't be allowed outside, so intelligent 
rules should be implemented to block this traffic but it should permit 
that faked traffic to be sent outside to not alert the attackers that 






3. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
To test this scenario a virtual network was developed. The network 
consisted of four Windows XP virtual workstations with different security 
configurations to represent various scenarios of real computers, the host 
computer running Windows 7 and running Snort to detect the network 
traffic and two honeypots forming a honeynet. 
 
The idea behind this configuration is that as any attack to the honeynet 
can affect the virtual workstations the different levels of security will be 
representative for different network security configurations. Of course 
that to ensure that the network was in fact vulnerable and that the 
security levels in the hosts was the determining factor, the traffic going 
out of the honeynet was not blocked, instead some ports were forwarded 
to the honeynet.  
 






4. PREPARATION OF THE PLATFORM 
 
4.1 Preparing the virtual workstations 
This was the most straightforward part of the whole project. First a 
virtual machine was created with the next characteristics: 
 OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits 
 Security: none 
 Hostname: WinXPI 
After this one was ready it was cloned. The resulting machine was 
different than the previous one in the fact that it had all windows 
patches to the date. 
 OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits 
 Security: Windows patches up to date 
 Hostname: WinXPII 
This machine was also cloned and the third one had an antivirus 
software installed and updated, AVG free edition. 
 OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits 
 Security: Windows patches up to date + AVG antivirus 
 Hostname: WinXPIII 
The fourth one had all that the previous one had plus Windows Firewall. 
 OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits 
 Security: Windows patches up to date + AVG antivirus + Firewall 








4.2 Preparing the honeynet 
The honeynet is composed of two virtual computers running several 
services each one. These were common services that are frequently prone 
to attacks such as web servers, FTP, Telnet, SMTP and MySQL. 
 
The first honeypot had the next configuration: 
 OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits 
 Security: none 
 Hostname: HP1 
 Services: Microsoft IIS 5.1, Telnet, FTP, SMTP, Unreal Media Server 
 
The second honeypot was configured as follows: 
 OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits 
 Security: none 
 Hostname: HP2 
 Services: WAMP5 version 1.7.1  
o Apache 2.2.4 
o MySQL 5.0.37 
 Also NetBIOS port was open. 
 
On the host machine the configuration was as following: 
 OS: Windows 7 Professional 64-bits 
 Security: Windows patches updated, antivirus, Windows Firewall, 
Windows Defender (anti spyware) 






4.3 The Network 
For this project it was used the network address 192.168.1.0/24 with 
the address distribution presented next: 
Gateway:  192.168.1.1 
Honeynet:  192.168.1.11 - 192.168.1.12 
Workstations: 192.168.1.13 - 192.168.1.16 
The host machine was left with a dynamic IP address but during the 
entire time of the project the router assigned the address 192.168.1.114. 
 
In the router's configuration the ports corresponding to the services 
running in the honeynet were redirected to the corresponding honeypot 
so they could be accessible from the Internet 
 






As can be seen in the previous image besides the ports of the services 
installed in the honeynet, some other ports were also redirected; the 
NetBIOS (139) and six RPC ports (445, 2103, 2105, 135, 1028, 2107). 
 
5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT 
 
After every virtual machine was ready the honeypot was started and 
connected to the Internet. Initially everything was fine except for one 
issue; the host machine wasn't detecting the traffic between virtual 
machines. Apparently the problem is that the traffic between VMs is 
handled internally by a virtual hub, so there is no need for that traffic to 
go to the host's NIC. The solution was the creation of another virtual 
machine in which Snort was installed, and as that VM was in the virtual 
hub all the traffic within the honeynet was captured. 
 
After that addition the final network diagram was like this 
 






After that issue was solved the honeynet was left running for two weeks. 
During that time span the Snort logs were checked frequently using 
Wireshark. It provides a very user-friendly interface and its Follow 
TCP/UDP streams feature is really helpful in assembling data exchange 
























6.1 Win32/Conficker.B infection 
The most notorious result during the deployment of the honeynet was 
the infection of the two honeypots that formed the honeynet and one of 
the workstations with a worm. When the symptoms were first noticed it 
wasn't obvious what type of worm was in the system, so to determine 
that several steps were followed. 
 
6.1.1 Understanding the symptoms 
The first clue that indicated that something was wrong was that two of 
the virtual machines were doing a similar routine when the operative 
system started.  
 After the network adapters initialized the infected computer search 
for a UPNP device using SSDP protocol. The destination IP address 
is 239.255.255.250 and port 1900 UDP. The router replies with its 











 After this, the infected machine establishes a set of TCP 
conversations with the default gateway of the network pointing to 
the port 5431 (Park-agent) - See Appendix C for more information. 
According to this source [13] here is some information about this 
port: 
"Technical description for port 5431: 
The deployment of applications via the network port 5431 means that these programs utilize the 
park-agent protocol. This service is known to execute on system boot up and is commonly." 
 
 After that, the infected computer connected to one these sites in 
order to obtain the current public IP address: "www.getmyip.org", 
"dyndns.org", "www.whatismyip.org", "www.whatismyipaddress.com".  
 
Figure 5 - Public IP address search 
 
 Then, the infected computer checks for the current time 
 






And suddenly after that it begins to search for random domains in the 
Internet or for hosts in the local network using ARP or reverse name 
resolution. It keeps looking for hosts in the local network until it finds 
one and tries to infect it. 
 
Figure 7 - DNS querys for random domains 
 
 
Figure 8 - Local network search using ARP 
 
In this image we can see that the computer with IP address 192.168.1.13 
was doing an sequential ARP request trying to detect other hosts in the 
local network. The IP address 192.168.1.1 did reply to the request and 
connection was intended to the port 445 without success.  
 
This port is used to run the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol directly 









Further observation showed a more interesting finding when one of the 
computers replied to the ARP request and a connection was established 
in the port 445.  
 
Figure 9 - A host replying to the ARP query 
 
 
Figure 10 - Infected computer trying to infect another host 
 
At this point it wasn't still clear what worm it was, but during the final 
days of the two weeks period of the honeynet being online, it was noticed 
that in two of the virtual machines Windows had not been activated. 
When attempting to activate Windows both machines failed. Looking for 
the reason it was found that this the computers could've be infected with 
Win32.Worm.Downadup.Gen [15]. What raised the alarm was that one of 
the characteristics of this worm is that the infected computer tried to 
connect to several random domains, just as in this case. Also the 
infected machine did a search for the public IP address in the URLs 
mentioned in that bulletin [15]. And finally it poisons the DNS cache to 







6.1.2 Confirming the hypothesis 
To determine if the worm was really Conficker or one of its variants we 
needed to determine the initial attack.  
In the next table we can see an exploit being executed on the 
NetPathCanonicalize function (vulnerability MS08-067 [16]). 
No Time Source Destination Protocol Information 
79592 7:38:35 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 TCP 
dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 TSV=0 
TSER=0 
79593 7:38:35 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 TCP 
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 
MSS=1460 TSV=0 TSER=0 
79599 7:38:35 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 TCP 
dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 TSV=1504645 
TSER=0 
79600 7:38:35 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Negotiate Protocol Request 
79602 7:38:35 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Negotiate Protocol Response 
79604 7:38:35 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE 
79608 7:38:35 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB 
Session Setup AndX Response, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE, Error: 
STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED 
79636 7:38:35 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: \ 
79713 7:38:36 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Session Setup AndX Response 
79800 7:38:36 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\200.42.242.108\IPC$ 
79801 7:38:36 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Tree Connect AndX Response 
79848 7:38:36 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB NT Create AndX Request, Path: \srvsvc 
80109 7:38:36 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 TCP 
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=506 Ack=830 Win=63411 Len=0 
TSV=321752 TSER=1504658 
80310 7:38:37 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB NT Create AndX Response, FID: 0x0000, Error: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED 
80412 7:38:37 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB NT Create AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, Path: \browser 
80423 7:38:37 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 TCP 
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=545 Ack=936 Win=63305 Len=0 
TSV=321759 TSER=1504666 
80524 7:38:37 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB NT Create AndX Response, FID: 0x4000 
80708 7:38:38 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 DCERPC Bind: call_id: 1 SRVSVC V3.0 
80710 7:38:38 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Write AndX Response, FID: 0x4000, 72 bytes 
80881 7:38:38 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Read AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, 1024 bytes at offset 0 
80959 7:38:38 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 TCP 
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=735 Ack=1139 Win=63102 Len=0 
TSV=321771 TSER=1504678 
80960 7:38:38 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 DCERPC Bind_ack: call_id: 1 accept max_xmit: 4280 max_recv: 4280 
81033 7:38:39 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SRVSVC NetPathCanonicalize request 
81036 7:38:39 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 TCP 
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=867 Ack=1931 Win=64240 Len=0 
TSV=321776 TSER=1504682 
86784 7:39:05 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Trans Request 
86787 7:39:05 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Close Request, FID: 0x4000 
86788 7:39:05 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Close Response, FID: 0x4000 
86791 7:39:05 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Logoff AndX Request 
86792 7:39:05 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Logoff AndX Response 
86794 7:39:06 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 SMB Tree Disconnect Request 
86795 7:39:06 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 SMB Tree Disconnect Response 
87334 7:39:06 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 TCP 
dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [FIN, ACK] Seq=2058 Ack=1027 Win=64509 Len=0 
TSV=1504952 TSER=322046 
87336 7:39:06 192.168.1.11 84.108.187.227 TCP 
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [FIN, ACK] Seq=1027 Ack=2059 Win=64113 Len=0 
TSV=322048 TSER=1504952 
87731 7:39:06 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 TCP dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [RST, ACK] Seq=2059 Ack=1027 Win=0 Len=0 
87732 7:39:06 84.108.187.227 192.168.1.11 TCP dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [RST] Seq=2059 Win=0 Len=0 














Highlighted the pattern that triggers the exploit. According to the author 
of this page [17], MS08-067 only patched the dynamic library netapi32.dll 
in which resides the vulnerable function. The problem with this pattern 
is that when the function NetPathCanonicalize receives it, it strips out 
any preceding directory behind the pattern. If nothing is found before the 
\..\..\ the function goes into some sort of recursion scanning back until 
it bust the stack. 
 
Another proof of the malicious nature of this payload is that at the same 
time Snort alerted of a possible Win32/Conficker.B related attack. 
[**] [1:2000002:1] Win32/Conficker.B shellcode [**] 
[Priority: 0]  
03/22-07:38:38.520950 84.108.187.227:1780 -> 192.168.1.11:445 
TCP TTL:107 TOS:0x0 ID:60410 IpLen:20 DgmLen:844 DF 
***AP*** Seq: 0xA5377D36  Ack: 0x52041AB6  Win: 0xFC9D  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 1504682 321771 
 
A couple of minutes later the attacked machine was spreading the worm 
to another hosts in the network. 
 
[**] [1:2000002:1] Win32/Conficker.B shellcode [**] 
[Priority: 0]  
03/22-07:41:32.457648 192.168.1.11:1121 -> 192.168.1.12:445 
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:1463 IpLen:20 DgmLen:832 DF 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6F7B87F  Ack: 0x21E16122  Win: 0xF78E  TcpLen: 20 
 






From this document [18] we learned that Win32/Conficker.B encoded the 
payload of the function by doing an XOR operation on the entire string 
byte by byte. Selecting the payload from the function 




















Again, highlighting the pattern that triggers the exploit.   


























That translated to string is 
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The malicious payload instructed the exploited machine to download the 
worm from the URL http://84.708.187.227:8341/gxyxl. This is the same 
IP address that exploited the machine in first place. The worm will be 
hidden within a file with a random name and one of the following file 











Finally the proof that Win32/Conficker.B was the detected malware 
 














6.2 Other recorded attacks  
 
6.2.1 SMTP attacks 
There were no recorded attacks to the SMTP service, but various events 
were detected. Some attempts to use the honeynet as a relay point to 
send spam email were detected from the one source IP. We can be sure 
that this remote host is most likely a zombie computer sending spam. 
 
Figure 14 - Spam attempted to be sent from the honeynet 
 
 













6.2.2 Buffer Overrun In RPCSS Service 
This vulnerability was attacked 19 times but it wasn't successfully 
exploited. It consists in an attack to the RPCSS service in the part that 
deals with the RPC messages. A successful exploit could allow the 
execution of arbitrary code [19]. 
Here is a sample of a Snort rule activating while detecting this attack. 
[**][1:3409:7] NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP IActivation remoteactivation 
overflow attempt[**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]  
03/27-20:04:53.223667 200.42.197.48:2422 -> 192.168.1.12:135 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1714 
***AP*** Seq: 0xF0BE3AEC  Ack: 0xBD1187BF  Win: 0xFAF0  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.mspx] 
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.mspx]  
 
No Time Source Destination Protocol Information 
53479 2948.217029 200.35.233.178 192.168.1.12 TCP hpiod > epmap [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460 
53480 2948.217157 192.168.1.12 200.35.233.178 TCP epmap > hpiod [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 
53518 2949.146491 200.35.233.178 192.168.1.12 TCP hpiod > epmap [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0 
53521 2949.722941 200.35.233.178 192.168.1.12 DCERPC Bind: call_id: 0 REMACT V0.0 
53522 2949.722949 192.168.1.12 200.35.233.178 DCERPC Bind_ack: call_id: 0 accept max_xmit: 5840 max_recv: 5840 
53548 2950.788937 200.35.233.178 192.168.1.12 TCP [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] 
53550 2950.971898 200.35.233.178 192.168.1.12 REMACT RemoteActivation request CLSID=NULL IID[1]=IUnknown 
53551 2950.971964 192.168.1.12 200.35.233.178 TCP epmap > hpiod [ACK] Seq=61 Ack=1747 Win=64240 Len=0 
53553 2951.171912 192.168.1.12 200.35.233.178 DCERPC Fault: call_id: 0 ctx_id: 0 status: nca_s_fault_access_denied 
53554 2951.172161 192.168.1.12 200.35.233.178 TCP epmap > hpiod [FIN, ACK] Seq=93 Ack=1747 Win=64240 Len=0 
53589 2952.406288 200.35.233.178 192.168.1.12 TCP hpiod > epmap [FIN, ACK] Seq=1747 Ack=93 Win=17428 Len=0 
53590 2952.406349 192.168.1.12 200.35.233.178 TCP epmap > hpiod [ACK] Seq=94 Ack=1748 Win=64240 Len=0 
53652 2956.360608 192.168.1.12 200.35.233.178 TCP epmap > hpiod [FIN, ACK] Seq=93 Ack=1748 Win=64240 Len=0 
53676 2957.885682 200.35.233.178 192.168.1.12 TCP [TCP ZeroWindow] hpiod > epmap [ACK] Seq=1748 Ack=94 Win=0 Len=0 
Figure 16 - Data flow for an attack to the MS03-039 vulnerability 
 











6.2.3 FTP server - Weak security configuration 
The FTP server had a very weak security configuration, as it allowed 
anonymous connections. This weakness was observed when a 
connection was established and the intruder executed a series of 
commands.  
 
Figure 17 - Succesful connection to FTP and commands executed 
 
In this connection the intruder changed the working directory to / listed 
the content of the directory and tried to create a folder. Even though 
nothing relevant was done by definition every traffic that goes in or out of 













6.2.4 Buffer Overrun In RPC Interface 
This vulnerability was attacked just once according to the Snort rules. 
This vulnerability resides in the part of the RPC that deals with message 
exchange over TCP/IP and the failure results because of an incorrect 
handling of malformed messages [20].  
Here is a sample of a Snort rule activating while detecting this attack. 
[**] [1:3397:8] NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP ISystemActivator 
RemoteCreateInstance attempt [**] 
[Classification: Generic Protocol Command Decode] [Priority: 3]  
03/27-17:17:46.242637 221.251.220.138:1276 -> 192.168.1.12:135 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1744 
***AP*** Seq: 0xE294F46  Ack: 0x566C5BBC  Win: 0xFAF0  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp] 
 
No Time Source Destination Protocol Information 
627289 17:44.4 221.251.220.138 192.168.1.12 TCP ivmanager > epmap [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460 
627290 17:44.4 192.168.1.12 221.251.220.138 TCP epmap > ivmanager [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 
627291 17:44.7 221.251.220.138 192.168.1.12 TCP ivmanager > epmap [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0 
627296 17:46.2 221.251.220.138 192.168.1.12 DCERPC Bind: call_id: 127 ISystemActivator V0.0 
627297 17:46.2 192.168.1.12 221.251.220.138 DCERPC Bind_ack: call_id: 127 accept max_xmit: 5840 max_recv: 5840 
627298 17:46.2 221.251.220.138 192.168.1.12 TCP [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] 
627299 17:46.2 221.251.220.138 192.168.1.12 ISystemActivator RemoteCreateInstance request[Long frame (1580 bytes)] 
627300 17:46.2 192.168.1.12 221.251.220.138 TCP epmap > ivmanager [ACK] Seq=61 Ack=1777 Win=64240 Len=0 
627301 17:46.2 192.168.1.12 221.251.220.138 DCERPC Fault: call_id: 229 ctx_id: 1 status: nca_s_fault_access_denied 
627302 17:46.2 192.168.1.12 221.251.220.138 TCP epmap > ivmanager [FIN, ACK] Seq=93 Ack=1777 Win=64240 Len=0 
627303 17:46.2 221.251.220.138 192.168.1.12 TCP ivmanager > epmap [FIN, ACK] Seq=1777 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0 
627304 17:46.2 192.168.1.12 221.251.220.138 TCP epmap > ivmanager [ACK] Seq=94 Ack=1778 Win=64240 Len=0 















At the beginning of this project we had two goals: the first goal was to 
compare the effect that the deployment of one or more honeypots could 
have in the production network depending on the security configuration 
of the network nodes. The second goal was a personal one and it was to 
understand how honeypots work, what tools are the most useful to 
analyze them and most specially how to use Snort. For this we took the 
approach of setting up a honeynet without the strict usage of a 
honeywall and let the security to be a matter of the hosts' configuration 
in the network. Representing the workstations that a typical network 
has, four virtual machines were installed with four different protection 
levels.  
 
As expected, besides of the two honeypot, the virtual machine with less 
security was the only one compromised, in this case infected by the 
worm Win32/Conficker.B.  In just under five minutes since the first 
successful attack this worm had infected the three computers. Thanks to 
the deployment of the honeynet in a controlled environment a deep 
understanding in how Win32/Conficker.B works was achieved, still some 
of the insides of the infection such as the registry keys modified could 
not been identified. Another important fact learned from this infection is 
that the presence of a firewall in a host can make a difference, in the 
alerts that Snort recorded in the event of a Win32/Conficker.B payload 
detected none of the two computers running a firewall (the Vmware host 
and WinXPIV) appeared as attacked. Also as important as the firewall are 
the Windows updates. Even when two of the computers did in fact were 
attacked as shown in the Snort traces none of them were infected most 






About the use, or in this case not use of a honeywall in the scenario, it 
resulted interesting how something that is deployed to secure the 
network of an institution or to be used for research can become so 
dangerous. In this experiment a honeywall was not used so when the 
honeypots were infected the malware communicated with the Internet 
without restraint. If this was the case of an institution its public IP 
address could appear as a source of malicious activities and be tagged as 
dangerous, hence it's extremely important not just for the security of the 
network but also for the cyber-image of the institution that a honeywall 
is deployed along the honeynet. 
 
Regarding the other attacks, even if no other attack was successful, it 
was learned that as soon as an IP address is available in the Internet is 
object of several attacks (just after 4 minutes of being online the 
honeynet registered the first contact), so security from the outside of the 
local network is a must in every situation. 
 
Finally about the personal goal I could obtain a huge amount of 
information in the deployment of honeynets and the tools used to analyze 
them. Special mention to Snort which at the beginning was used as a 
mere sniffer, but at the end with was used for much more than that as it 
allowed me to analyze the capture files and match the information 
against a set of rules to produce important alerts that helped to the 
development of this report. Another interesting surprise is The Honeynet 
Project [5] which has been studying the development of malware in the 
Internet since 1999, it is a great source of information for this field and 
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Snort rules to detect Conficker payload 
 
These Snort rules were used to detect Win32/Conficker.A and 
Win32/Conficker.B payloads. Were extracted from this source [18]. 
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 445 (msg: "conficker.a shellcode"; 
content: "|e8 ff ff ff ff c1|^|8d|N|10 80|1|c4|Af|81|9EPu|f5 ae c6 9d 
a0|O|85 ea|O|84 c8|O|84 d8|O|c4|O|9c cc|IrX|c4 c4 c4|,|ed c4 c4 c4 
94|&<O8|92|\;|d3|WG|02 c3|,|dc c4 c4 c4 f7 16 96 96|O|08 a2 03 c5 bc ea 
95|\;|b3 c0 96 96 95 92 96|\;|f3|\;|24|i| 95 92|QO|8f f8|O|88 cf bc c7 
0f f7|2I|d0|w|c7 95 e4|O|d6 c7 17 f7 04 05 04 c3 f6 c6 86|D|fe c4 
b1|1|ff 01 b0 c2 82 ff b5 dc b6 1b|O|95 e0 c7 17 cb|s|d0 b6|O|85 d8 c7 
07|O|c0|T|c7 07 9a 9d 07 a4|fN|b2 e2|Dh|0c b1 b6 a8 a9 ab aa c4|]|e7 99 
1d ac b0 b0 b4 fe eb eb|"; sid: 2000001; rev: 1;) 
 
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 445 (msg: "Win32/Conficker.B 
shellcode"; content: "|e8 ff ff ff ff c2|_|8d|O|10 
80|1|c4|Af|81|9MSu|f5|8|ae c6 9d a0|O|85 ea|O|84 c8|O|84 d8|O|c4|O|9c 
cc|Ise|c4 c4 c4|,|ed c4 c4 c4 94|&<O8|92|\;|d3|WG|02 c3|,|dc c4 c4 c4 
f7 16 96 96|O|08 a2 03 c5 bc ea 95|\;|b3 c0 96 96 95 92 96|\;|f3|\;|24 
|i|95 92|QO|8f f8|O|88 cf bc c7 0f f7|2I|d0|w|c7 95 e4|O|d6 c7 17 cb c4 
04 cb|{|04 05 04 c3 f6 c6 86|D|fe c4 b1|1|ff 01 b0 c2 82 ff b5 dc b6 
1f|O|95 e0 c7 17 cb|s|d0 b6|O|85 d8 c7 07|O|c0|T|c7 07 9a 9d 07 
a4|fN|b2 e2|Dh|0c b1 b6 a8 a9 ab aa c4|]|e7 99 1d ac b0 b0 b4 fe eb 
















Other findings related to Win32/Conficker.B 
 
Some other characteristics of the worm are the following: 
1. It deletes every restoration point and stop the System Restore 
service. 
2. Stop Security Center service 
3. Stop Automatic Update service 
4. Install itself as a service with a random name 
All this can be seen in the next images. It can be seen that the hour of 
these events is the same as the Snort alert and the network traces. 
 
 
Figure 19 - Stop System Restore service  Figure 20 - Stop Security Center service 
 
 
Figure 21 - Stop Automatic Updates service 
 











Information about Park-agent port 
 
During one part of the routine that the machines infected with 
Win32/Conficker.B did it was the establishment of a series of TCP 
conversations with the router.  
POST /uuid:0021-299c-af7502f8b8a4/WANPPPConnection:1 HTTP/1.1 
Host: 192.168.1.1:5431 



















HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
DATE: Mon, 29 Mar 2010 23:43:58 GMT 
Connection: Keep-Alive 
Server: LINUX/2.4 UPnP/1.0 BRCM400/1.0 
Content-Length: 541 
































Running Snort rules against capture files 
 
This is the result of Snort after comparing the capture files of the two 
weeks period against the Snortrules snapshot 2.8 (4-Mar-2010). 
 
Run time for packet processing was 301.960000 seconds 
=============================================================================== 
Snort processed 11016905 packets. 
=============================================================================== 
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets): 
      ETH: 11016905   (100.000%) 
  ETHdisc: 0          (0.000%) 
     VLAN: 0          (0.000%) 
     IPV6: 10003      (0.091%) 
  IP6 EXT: 0          (0.000%) 
  IP6opts: 0          (0.000%) 
  IP6disc: 0          (0.000%) 
      IP4: 10969960   (99.574%) 
  IP4disc: 0          (0.000%) 
    TCP 6: 0          (0.000%) 
    UDP 6: 0          (0.000%) 
    ICMP6: 0          (0.000%) 
  ICMP-IP: 0          (0.000%) 
      TCP: 10927697   (99.190%) 
      UDP: 38273      (0.347%) 
     ICMP: 3741       (0.034%) 
  TCPdisc: 0          (0.000%) 
  UDPdisc: 0          (0.000%) 
  ICMPdis: 0          (0.000%) 
     FRAG: 0          (0.000%) 
   FRAG 6: 0          (0.000%) 
      ARP: 36942      (0.335%) 
    EAPOL: 0          (0.000%) 
  ETHLOOP: 0          (0.000%) 
      IPX: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv4/IPv4: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv4/IPv6: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv6/IPv4: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv6/IPv6: 0          (0.000%) 
      GRE: 0          (0.000%) 
  GRE ETH: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE VLAN: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE IPv4: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE IPv6: 0          (0.000%) 
GRE IP6 E: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE PPTP: 0          (0.000%) 
  GRE ARP: 0          (0.000%) 
  GRE IPX: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE LOOP: 0          (0.000%) 
     MPLS: 0          (0.000%) 
    OTHER: 249        (0.002%) 
  DISCARD: 0          (0.000%) 
InvChkSum: 0          (0.000%) 
   S5 G 1: 606364     (5.504%) 
   S5 G 2: 3108       (0.028%) 
























        Total Fragments: 0 
      Frags Reassembled: 0 
               Discards: 0 
          Memory Faults: 0 
               Timeouts: 0 
               Overlaps: 0 
              Anomalies: 0 
                 Alerts: 0 
                  Drops: 0 
     FragTrackers Added: 0 
    FragTrackers Dumped: 0 
FragTrackers Auto Freed: 0 
    Frag Nodes Inserted: 0 
     Frag Nodes Deleted: 0 
=============================================================================== 
Stream5 statistics: 
            Total sessions: 813673 
              TCP sessions: 813673 
              UDP sessions: 0 
             ICMP sessions: 0 
                TCP Prunes: 0 
                UDP Prunes: 0 
               ICMP Prunes: 0 
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 848050 
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 848050 
              TCP Timeouts: 34586 
              TCP Overlaps: 342 
       TCP Segments Queued: 5824853 
     TCP Segments Released: 5824853 
       TCP Rebuilt Packets: 5786090 
         TCP Segments Used: 5822325 
              TCP Discards: 2674 
      UDP Sessions Created: 0 
      UDP Sessions Deleted: 0 
              UDP Timeouts: 0 
              UDP Discards: 0 
                    Events: 0 
           Internal Events: 0 
           TCP Port Filter 
                   Dropped: 0 
                 Inspected: 0 
                   Tracked: 10318225 
           UDP Port Filter 
                   Dropped: 0 
                 Inspected: 0 
                   Tracked: 0 
=============================================================================== 
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included): 
    POST methods:                   172 
    GET methods:                    9782 
    Headers extracted:              9954 
    Header Cookies extracted:       142 
    Post parameters extracted:      172 
    Unicode:                        0 
    Double unicode:                 0 
    Non-ASCII representable:        0 
    Base 36:                        0 
    Directory traversals:           0 
    Extra slashes ("//"):           18 
    Self-referencing paths ("./"):  0 
    Total packets processed:        11667618 
=============================================================================== 
dcerpc2 Preprocessor Statistics 
  Total sessions: 606452 








  Transports 
    SMB 
      Total sessions: 606429 
      Packet stats 
        Packets: 5745619 
        Ignored bytes: 276038478 
        Not IPC packets (after tree connect): 68191 
        Not NBSS Session Message: 2 
        Seg reassembled: 9 
        Session Setup AndX requests: 1144574 
        Session Setup AndX responses: 1143473 
        Logoff AndX requests: 216300 
        Logoff AndX responses: 216258 
        Tree Connect AndX requests: 641126 
        Tree Connect AndX responses: 641126 
        Tree Disconnect requests: 216248 
        Tree Disconnect responses: 216209 
        Nt Create AndX requests: 2737 
        Nt Create AndX responses: 2737 
        Close requests: 911 
        Close responses: 910 
        Transact requests: 6076 
        Transact responses: 6069 
        Write AndX requests: 978 
        Write AndX responses: 978 
        Read AndX requests: 937 
        Read AndX responses: 935 
        SMB other command requests: 90 
        SMB other command responses: 90 
    TCP 
      Total sessions: 23 
      Packet stats 
        Packets: 85 
 
  DCE/RPC 
    Connection oriented 
      Packet stats 
        PDUs: 8957 
        Bind: 972 
        Bind Ack: 969 
        Alter context: 5 
        Alter context response: 5 
        Request: 3530 
        Response: 3423 
        Fault: 45 
        Request fragments: 42 
          Min fragment size: 4 
          Max fragment size: 2200 
          Frag reassembled: 21 
        Response fragments: 0 
        Client seg reassembled: 3 
        Server seg reassembled: 5 
=============================================================================== 
SSL Preprocessor: 
   SSL packets decoded: 758 
          Client Hello: 43 
          Server Hello: 2 
           Certificate: 0 
           Server Done: 72 
   Client Key Exchange: 35 
   Server Key Exchange: 0 
         Change Cipher: 72 
              Finished: 0 
    Client Application: 48 
    Server Application: 32 
                 Alert: 0 
  Unrecognized records: 597 
  Completed handshakes: 0 
        Bad handshakes: 0 
      Sessions ignored: 32 
    Detection disabled: 0 
=============================================================================== 
Snort exiting 
